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Depiction and the Sense of Reality
  John Armstrong 
Rembrandt, A Canal with a Rowing Boat, pen and ink drawing.
This image is used with the permission of Chatsworth Photo Library. Any
form of reproduction, transmission, performance, display, rental, lending or
storage in any retrieval system without the written consent of the
copyright holders is prohibited.
1. The Ordinary Force of 'Realistic'
Suppose we say that this image is 'realistic', what are we
getting at here with the world 'realistic'? 'Realistic' is a term of
everyday use and a word that non-academics use frequently
and unguardedly in talking about pictures. Roughly, it can be
taken to mean that the depiction is like the real thing of which
it is a depiction; more specifically that the depiction is like the
real thing with respect to its visual character.
This way of speaking is obviously problematic. People inclined
to say that the Rembrandt drawing is realistic have presumably
never seen that canal as it was when Rembrandt made this
drawing. And when we imagine what the depicted scene must
have looked like, in reality, we can easily grasp that there
would have been many visual differences of colour and detail
between it and the drawing. And yet, the desire to say that
this drawing is realistic persists. Conversational logic does not
recognise a contradiction here. One might cheerfully accept
both of these apparent grounds for denying that the drawing is
realistic and still say: 'yes, but it looks realistic all the same'. In
other words, the force of 'realistic' (in at least the paradigm
case of this drawing) doesn't seem to depend upon
acquaintance with the actual appearance of the depicted
subject matter, nor does it appear to depend upon the
comprehensiveness of visual detail realized in the depiction.
In saying that the depiction is realistic we are not appealing to
a close resemblance between the depiction and the subject
matter (we're not claiming that the canal looked just like that).
So, what are we saying?
2. 'Realistic' Appeals to Our Sense of Material Reality
We might start to make sense of the force of 'realistic' by
considering the idea of reality that the word 'realistic' appeals
to. In the context of a drawing, or of any work of visual art,
'realistic' means like, but not the same as, reality. So, how
should we construe the notion of reality?
When Samuel Johnson attempted to refute Berkeley's idealism
by kicking a stone, he was revealing himself a poor
metaphysician. However, he was also revealing something
quite simple about our ordinary sense of reality. The
characteristics of 'reality' that Johnson emphasised were these:
a 'real' object is something I can touch, it resists my motion, it
has weight and solidity. The idea is of an external object that
exists independently and apart from me and with which I can
interact. Of course this is wholly inadequate as a philosophical
account of reality. But that is not the aim, here. What we are
searching for is an elucidation of what might be at stake in
calling a depiction 'realistic'. And that term is one employed by
people without reference to any grand or complex conception of
reality.
The relevant notion of 'real' alludes to at least the following
four features of experience; features, that is, of our ordinary
interaction with the kinds of things that we encounter
depictions of. Consider the example of looking at a human
being.
3. The Ordered Disclosure of Detail
There are no gaps or breaks in the visual detail of the object.
Whichever part of the body we look at will have some visual
character, and that visual character will be disclosed to us in
greater detail as we concentrate upon it or move closer or see
it in more powerful illumination. The closer the scrutiny, the
more will be revealed to sight.
Thus, a depiction will be 'realistic' to the extent that it
replicates this experience of being open to further visual
scrutiny. If you ask of any particular depicted features what its
detail appearance is, the depiction gives you an answer. And,
centrally, this answer is yielded in the same way it would be if
one were encountering a 'real' object: you move closer, you
look with greater concentration.
In the Wallace Collection in London there is a portrait by Van
Dyke of a seated woman, which is highly realistic in this sense.
Seeing it from the far side of the room, we can make out
certain details; but, if we want to see just what colour her eyes
are, the shape of the corners of her mouth, the colour of her
fingernails, we have to do exactly what we would do if we were
looking at a real woman from a similar distance. We have to
walk towards the image and as we do so, the visual detail is
disclosed to us at the same pace and in the same order as it
would be if we were walking towards an actual person.
This is why we can say that the image is highly realistic even
though we have no idea whatever whether it resembles the
woman who actually sat for Van Dyke. Instead what is at stake
is that our visual encounter with the depiction is like our visual
encounter with a real object of the appropriate type. This is not
to suggest that, in such a case, we take the depiction (in error)
to be a real woman, only that our engagement with the
depiction is like our engagement with a real woman, with
respect to the disclosure of visual information.
An issue which we hope the discussion of realism will clarify is
this: how is it that there are so many different ways in which a
depiction can be realistic. While some realistic depictions
include a great deal of visual detail, many (such as the
Rembrandt sketch) do not. One option is to regard the term
'realistic' as infelicitous, as masking an important difference.
But another option is available: the accumulation of visual
detail (when it is disclosed to sight as in the van Dyke portrait)
achieves an end that can also be achieved in other ways. The
relevant end is the portrayal of the depicted object as if it were
a real object.
To put the point more simply, the accumulation of detail that I
have mentioned in connection with the Van Dyke portrait is not
a necessary condition for realism. However, it is necessarily
productive of realism. For there are, as I suggest below, other
ways in which our sense of reality can be engaged by a
depiction.
4. The Object Located in Space
Our perceptual experience of a real person has a particular
structure to it: the body is a three dimensional object located
in space, and therefore when we see it from a particular point
of view only certain parts of it are visible while others are
occluded.
Thus, the more a depiction conveys to us a three-dimensional
character, and the more firmly that object is located in a
coherent spatial order with other objects, the more it looks
'real', the more we see it as being like a real thing. Consider
the difference between a two-dimensional architectural
elevation, which may convey a great deal of accurate visual
information about the façade of a building, and a rapid sketch
by a fine draughtsman which, although short on detail, gives a
strong impression of the three-dimensional character of the
building. The latter may well look much more realistic than the
former. The reason is that three-dimensionality is a central
feature of our sense of the reality of objects, of their material
existence apart from us. This explains why the practice of
shading, when carried out with even a modest degree of
competence, rapidly enhance the realism of a drawing. For by
conveying the three-dimensional character of the depicted
object, its depiction as a material object in space (hence as a
'real' object) is enhanced.
When an unaccomplished amateur draws a picture of a
standing person the figure has a tendency to 'float' in the
vague space of the surface on which it is drawn. The realism of
the depiction can be augmented by the simple device of adding
a line beneath the figure that suggests that the figure is
standing on something: that is, the figure is located in relation
to something else. And being precisely located in space, in
relation to other objects, is a core feature of real material
objects. In the Rembrandt sketch above, there is a very clear
sense that the boat is on the water; this effect is surprisingly
difficult to achieve.
One of the most striking examples of realism, along these lines,
is to be found in Corot's painting View of St.-Lo (Louvre). It
depicts the towers of a church seen across a valley, from a
distance of perhaps half a mile. The extraordinary thing is the
degree to which a sense of specific distance has been created.
Although much of the intermediate detail is obscured in the
picture the location of the towers in space is astonishingly
precise. Even if we cannot say exactly how far the towers are
from us, they look as if they are some precise distance. That is,
they have the character of real objects in space. On looking at
a real tower approximately half a mile away, I may not be able
to judge with any great accuracy what the distance is, but my
sense is that there is some exact measure of the distance to be
had.
For the person learning to paint or draw the achievement of
realism of this kind is exceedingly difficult. The reason, in the
instance of the Corot picture, is that it depends upon several
independent techniques: illumination, focus and the record of
detail. To comment only on the last of these at this stage: what
Corot has managed to do is record exactly the degree of detail
which one would normally be able to see of a building of that
scale (in such a degree of illumination and when focusing on it
to the degree the picture suggests).
5. The Depiction of Weight and Movement
A perceived body actually has many physical qualities that are
disclosed to sight in a complex way. For example, the human
body will have a particular weight, which is supported on its
legs and by its internal structure; the weight is distributed
differently depending upon how the person is standing, and of
course very differently when in motion. The limbs have a
degree of strength; there are distributions of muscular tension
and relaxation that depend upon movement and posture.
Although we do not straightforwardly see the weight of a body,
we certainly have visual experience marked by a sense of
weight, tension and solidity.
Weight and solidity cannot be straightforwardly depicted. Our
ability to recognise, on a visual basis, such things as the effort
that a person is making (say in lifting a weight) or the kind of
movement they are making, seems to require only rather
specific sorts of evidence. The position of the joints counts for
much more, in such matters, than many other details. If I
glance at a person, and notice very little about him or her (in
terms of the details of appearance) I may still be able to see
whether the person is balanced or about to topple over; I can
see that the person is carrying a heavy load or perhaps a large
object that is actually quite light.
This suggests that the visual evidence upon which we attribute
such things is rather specialised. It is, therefore, quite possible
in a depiction to present the relevant visual evidence (for a
person standing in a balanced posture, or making an effort to
lift a heavy weight) while omitting many other visual details.
The point that is important to the current discussion is that the
depiction of such features is very important in the creation of a
sense of the 'reality' of the thing depicted. For it presents,
visually, the causal interaction of the depicted thing with other
material objects (a weight, the ground). And such interaction is
a crucial element in our ordinary conception of what it is for an
object to be real.
Thus when we say that the depiction of the boat in
Rembrandt's drawing is realistic, we might be getting at the
way in which the boat looks as if it is actually in the water; it
has weight and solidity. This effect has been achieved not so
much through careful delineation of the shape or material
structure of the boat, but by the particular placing of the boat
in the water and the contrastive depiction of the surface of the
water as a continuous sheet which is broken and displaced by
the boat.
6. Vitality
A living person looks alive; our perception of vitality is bound
up with an awareness of possible motion. We see someone who
is actually stationary, but the person may look as if about to
move. Our recognition of such characteristics in the case of
actual people occurs visually, although it attributes more than
can literally be seen at any precise moment. There are visual
indicators of 'being about to move' or 'being slumped in
exhaustion'. We are not good, perhaps, at isolating these
indicators in a self-conscious fashion, although we are
responsive to them. An artist who can isolate such visual
indicators can, by deploying them in a depiction, endow the
depicted object with such characteristics. And the way in which
the depiction gains this content parallels our visual recognition
of such characteristics in actual people.
To endow a depicted person with a quality such as 'being
slumped in exhaustion' or 'being about to move' is to endow
them with characteristics that are central to our sense of the
reality of other people as independent of us and alive: as 'real'.
And because the visual indicators of these kinds of
characteristics are, in principle, separable from many other
visual details, there is no mystery in the fact that they can be
depicted in isolation from the depiction of other visual
characteristics.
Thus it is possible for a depiction to be 'realistic' in a high
degree with respect to certain characteristics but not with
respect to others. This is an extension of an obvious point
about depiction. When a object is depicted we can always say
more precisely which visual aspects of the object have been
depicted. Thus Rembrandt has depicted a boat, but not the
colour of the boat. Or, in a famous example, Monet depicted
very carefully, the tonal variations on the façade of a cathedral,
but not the structural details of the façade.
7. The Temporal Aspects of Visual Experience
Our experience of looking at a person, or at an object, is often
marked by a temporal character where the temporality is a
feature of the manner of visual engagement. We might glance
at them, we might stare at them; we might have the sense that
we are seeing this person at a specific moment in time.
A special way in which temporality enters a depiction is in the
evocation of our sense of a particular moment, a particularity
not connected to duration (as in the example just discussed)
but to something else which it is harder to define. In a famous
painting by the nineteenth century German artist Menzel, (in
the National Gallery in Berlin) entitled The Balcony Room, there
is an extraordinary portrayal of light. The picture is sketchy on
many details of the room depicted, but the sense we have of
the reality of daylight is uncanny. And this is closely connected
to the experience the beholder has of seeing the room at a
particular moment. This is not a matter of knowing which
moment has been depicted (what year or day or time of day).
This phenomenon, the sense of the particular moment in time,
is related to realism. It serves to anchor the depiction in the
ordinary aspect of our sense of reality, namely that we
encounter the external world in the present, that is, within a
temporal dimension.
8. Kant's Question
This approach to realism is broadly Kantian in inspiration. A
central question, for Kant, can be put in the following way:
What is it that enables the input of intuition to be experienced
as perception of an independent, objective world? Kant's
suggestion is that the material of intuition is organized in
various ways: partly by the structure of continuous space and
time, partly by deployment of the categories of the
understanding: most notably substance and causal interaction.
Phenomenologically, at least, this is astute. Our sense of the
external reality of objects precisely does seem to rest upon our
experiencing them as substantial (continuing to exist when we
don't see them), and colloquially, as solid and with weight, as
causally interacting with each other and as located in space
and time. On this view, to make a 'realistic' depiction is to
endow the depicted object with just such a range of features;
and, further, to disclose those characteristics to sight in a way
that runs parallel to our visual recognition of the same qualities
in real objects.
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